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The traditional answer to the question what it is to make an 
assertion appeals to belief (see Grice 1989 and Searle 
1969). To assert something, so the analysis goes, is to 
express a belief by way of uttering a sentence. Timothy 
Williamson claims (1) that on the traditional analysis 
assertion is constitutively governed by the truth rule (242):1 
One must: assert p only if p is true. 
He argues (2) that the traditional analysis is mistaken, and 
(3) that assertion is constitutively governed by the 
knowledge rule instead (243): 
One must: assert p only if one knows p. 
I will argue that all three of these claims are false. 
Williamson and I share the view that assertion can be 
characterised in terms of constitutive rules. However, we 
disagree about what constitutive rules are. Williamson 
claims that constitutive rules do not specify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the relevant act. I will argue that 
many of them do. Furthermore, the exceptions cannot be 
used to Williamson’s advantage.2 
1. Constitutive Rules and Regulative Rules 
According to Searle, who introduced the term ‘constitutive 
rule’, the syntax of a constitutive rule is ‘X counts as Y in 
C’; he contrasts constitutive rules to regulative rules, the 
syntax of which is ‘Do X’, or ‘If Y, do X’. Neither the truth 
rule nor the knowledge rule has the syntax that constitutive 
rules have according to Searle. Reformulating the rules in 
such a way that they do results in manifest nonsense 
(‘knowing p counts as asserting p’ is obviously inadequate; 
‘p being true counts as asserting p’ even more so). The 
syntax of the truth rule and the knowledge rule is: ‘One 
must: do X only if Y’. This resembles the structure of regu-
lative rules more closely than that of constitutive rules. 
There is no mention of the phrase ‘counts as’. Further-
more, it contains an imperative. Finally, no reference is 
made to a context or a set of conditions C. 
This third point demands further attention. On Searle’s 
view, (only) constitutive rules define what I will call ‘Y 
terms’. Y terms stand for institutional statuses (Searle 
1995). Actions that are Y are constituted by actions that 
are X. This suggests that Searle’s choice of symbols in the 
second formulation of regulative rules is somewhat 
unfortunate. Since there are many regulative rules in which 
no institutional statuses occur, a better proposal would be 
‘If C, do X’. Similarly, one could render the syntax of 
Williamson’s rules as ‘One must: do X only if C’. This 
means that the Y term is missing rather than the C term, 
which only strengthens the suspicion that Williamson’s 
rules are regulative rules rather than constitutive rules. 
Only regulative rules can do without Y terms; constitutive 
rules cannot. Williamson could respond by insisting that 
the syntax of his rules is: ‘One must: do Y only if C’. The 
problem with this is that the formulation remains unin-
formative with respect to the constitution of institutional 
                                                     
1 Page references are to Williamson (2000). 
2 Due to space constraints, I have little opportunity to argue for positive points 
here. See my ‘Knowledge and the Constitutive Rule of Assertion’ for a more 
elaborate defence and a modification of the traditional analysis. The paper is 
available from the author on request (hindriks@fwb.eur.nl). 
statuses – in contrast to what one can reasonably expect 
from a constitutive rule. 
All this makes one wonder why Williamson believes that 
the rules mentioned are constitutive rules in the first place. 
Williamson contrasts constitutive rules to conventions, 
which are a type of rule for action just as regulative rules 
are. On his view, the difference between constitutive rules 
and conventions is that, whereas conventions govern the 
acts to which they pertain only contingently, constitutive 
rules govern them necessarily. He writes: ‘[A] rule will 
count as constitutive of an act only if it is essential to that 
act: necessarily, the rule governs every performance of the 
act.’ (239) Even though this may be an important feature of 
the difference between constitutive rules and rules for 
action such as conventions and regulative rules, it falls 
short of a full characterisation of the distinction. As said 
earlier, it leaves us in the dark with respect to the 
constitution of institutional statuses. 
An obvious development of the notion of a constitutive 
rule would be to say that such rules specify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the applicability of Y terms. This is 
exactly what Williamson denies (240). He has good 
reasons for this. However, as we will see in the next 
section, they fall short of establishing the adequacy of the 
conception of constitutive rules he proposes. 
2. Constitutive Rules and Necessary 
Conditions 
An important thing to appreciate is that constitutive rules 
can and sometimes do specify necessary and sufficient 
conditions for institutional statuses. This can easily be 
illustrated with a constitutive rule that applies to objects 
rather than actions (the point generalises to many 
institutional actions). I will use the institutional term ‘dollar 
bill’ as an example. Dollar bills are pieces of paper of a 
certain size, made of a particular kind of material with a 
peculiar print. Counterfeit dollar bills may have all these 
features. What makes them counterfeit, is that they are 
printed without proper authorisation. Combining these 
features results in the following (rough) characterisation of 
the constitutive rule for ‘dollar bill’: 
A piece of paper of a certain size, made of a particular 
kind of material with a peculiar print, the issuing of which 
has been authorised by the Federal Reserve counts as a 
dollar bill. 
My claim is that once the details of this rule have been 
filled in (and perhaps some minor flaws have been fixed) it 
specifies the conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for being a dollar bill. For our purposes, it is the necessity 
claim that matters: no piece of paper that does not have all 
these features is a dollar bill. 
This pure case is quite useful for diagnosing the flaws in 
Williamson’s position. What he seems to be after is a 
conception of constitutive rules on which they govern 
actions without this entailing that the rules are obeyed. The 
problem with this is that it makes little sense to talk of 
obeying constitutive rules. Regulative rules can be obeyed 
or disobeyed, because they are imperatives. Constitutive 
rules, however, are meaning rules. They provide defini-




tions that tell us something about the constitution of the 
statuses to which the terms defined pertain. They do not 
tell us what to do. This means that they cannot be 
disobeyed. They can only be misapplied. In the pure cases 
in which the relevant constitutive rules specify necessary 
and sufficient conditions, whether or not they are misap-
plied depends on whether the relevant conditions have 
been satisfied. In impure cases things are more compli-
cated than this, as we will see shortly. However, the basic 
point remains: constitutive rules cannot be disobeyed. 
Williamson cites games and languages as examples that 
show that not all constitutive rules specify necessary 
conditions. He writes: 
When one breaks a rule of a game, one does not 
thereby cease to be playing that game. When one 
breaks a rule of a language, one does not thereby cease 
to be speaking that language; speaking English un-
grammatically is speaking English. (240) 
The remark about games as such is not fully convincing. 
Games consist of several rules, some constitutive and 
some regulative (Lewis 1983). Some of these rules may 
contain provisions for breaches of others. If one (of the 
regulative) rule(s) is broken, the game may go on in virtue 
of a rule that specifies what to do in such a situation. At 
least in some sense, the set of rules of a game considered 
as a whole is satisfied in spite of the breach of one of the 
rules. This explains why the game continues, one could 
argue. 
It is easy, however, to come up with a stronger example. 
Consider a soccer game during which the ball hits the net 
of one of the goals. If no violation (of a regulative rule) was 
made immediately leading up to the event and the umpire 
calls it, a goal has been scored. If someone was in an 
offside position and the umpire notices this, he will not call 
a goal (assuming he has not been bribed). However, if he 
fails to notice it and calls a goal anyway, it counts 
(assuming his decision is not overruled by a higher 
authority). One can analyse this case in the following way. 
Even though the condition that no one is in an offside 
position just before the ball enters the goal is part of the 
constitutive rule for ‘goal’, it is not a necessary condition for 
scoring a goal. The call of the umpire is decisive. 
Williamson’s second example is relevant as well. It does 
not involve an authoritative person such as an umpire, and 
should be diagnosed differently. Note first that, once again, 
the example is too crude. Arguably, there is no constitutive 
rule of speaking a language (let alone of speaking a 
language grammatically correct). Instead, there are various 
grammar rules some of which define grammatical concepts 
(while others regulate linguistic practices). There need not 
be an overarching constitutive rule that defines ‘English 
grammar’. Independently of such a rule, it is plausible that 
one speaks a language if one obeys a sufficient number 
rather than all of its rules. However, if we suppose there is 
such an overarching constitutive rule, we can say that the 
institutional status is instantiated in spite of the fact that not 
all of the conditions specified by the rule are met. This is 
due to the fact that a sufficient number of such conditions 
have been met. 
So it is indeed possible that the constituted act is per-
formed even though the relevant constitutive rule has not 
been (fully) satisfied. Constitutive rules do not always 
specify necessary conditions. In some cases, an authority 
such as a judge or umpire plays a role. In others, the 
institutional status is instantiated due to the fact that a 
sufficient number of conditions specified by its constitutive 
rule has been met. Before turning to a discussion of how 
this reflects on the knowledge rule and the truth rule, let 
me make a couple of points. First, the cases just discussed 
suggest that in the ideal case all the conditions specified 
by a constitutive rule are satisfied.3 Someone who speaks 
perfect English does not violate any of the rules of 
grammar. Ideally, umpires make no mistakes (and are 
sincere). Second, even in the non-ideal cases, it is clear 
what constitutes the institutional status. It is the fact that a 
sufficient number of conditions has been met or the 
declaration of someone in authority, which may be based 
on the belief that most or all conditions have been met. 
3. The Knowledge Rule, the Truth Rule, and 
the Traditional Analysis 
A straightforward line of argument is now available against 
the view that knowledge is the only ingredient of the 
constitutive rule of assertion. First, the knowledge rule is 
not a constitutive rule (see section 1). Second, if knowl-
edge were the only ingredient of a constitutive rule of 
assertion, we would have to know that which we assert, 
and we know that this is often not the case (as Williamson 
acknowledges; e.g. 243). If the knowledge requirement is 
not met, there is nothing else left to constitute the status of 
assertion. At least normally, there is no authority involved 
in making assertions. Furthermore, the sufficient number 
argument cannot apply if knowledge is the only ingredient. 
(See section 2.) It follows that assertion should not be 
characterised in terms of the knowledge rule. 
One might want to propose a disjunctive analysis on 
which knowledge is only one of the ingredients of the 
constitutive rule. The problem with this is that the other 
ingredients would most likely be truth, justification, and/or 
belief. On the (admittedly controversial) assumption that 
knowledge entails all these three, it would not play an 
independent role. One of the three ingredients (or a 
combination of them) would suffice. This suggests the 
stronger conclusion that knowledge does not appear in the 
constitutive rule of assertion at all. 
The preceding also indicates that the traditional analysis 
should not be interpreted in terms of the truth rule. The 
presence of an imperative already indicates it is not a 
constitutive rule either. Instead, the traditional analysis 
should be put in terms of what one might call the belief 
rule, which is a genuine constitutive rule:4 
An utterance u counts as an assertion of p just if the 
person who utters it thereby expresses her belief that p. 
In contrast to knowledge, belief does figure in the 
constitutive rule of assertion. The belief rule fits nicely with 
what Grice and Searle say about assertion. It even fits 
perfectly with some of the things Williamson writes. 
Consider the following passage: ‘[A]ssertion is the exterior 
analogue of judgement, which stands to belief as act to 
state.’ (238) This idea is adequately captured by the belief 
rule. 
                                                     
3 The point requires some rephrasing in cases where multiple realisibility is 
relevant (think of dollars that can be made of paper as well as traces on 
computers). In such cases, a disjunctive analysis is called for and only one set 
of conditions has to be satisfied. 
4 This formulation is obviously incomplete. For one thing, the analysis does not 
include all conditions that make an utterance an expression of one proposition 
rather than another. This can be resolved by adding conditions drawn from 
agent-based semantics in the tradition of Grice and Lewis. 





Three points have been argued for in the face of William-
son’s claims to the contrary. First, assertion is not to be 
characterised in terms of the knowledge rule. Second, the 
traditional analysis should not be understood in terms of 
the truth rule. Third, the traditional analysis should be 
understood in terms of the belief rule. The arguments 
presented provide indirect support for the traditional 
analysis.5 
                                                     
5 I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Igor Douven and Agustin 
Rayo. 
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